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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This paper presents the perspective of the author, a trade and
investment policy official, on the most significant aspects of the
United States policy toward foreign direct investment. The summary in this section is presented to give the author's policy view* Assistant United States Trade Representative for International Investment
Policy; Ph.D. International Economics, University of Maryland. Mr. Bale has
also served in the Office of Trade Policy of the United States Department of
Commerce, and as Chief Economist and Trade Negotiator for the United States
Delegation to teh Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva,
Switzerland.
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point in order to assist the reader in evaluating the paper's
arguments.
A number of developed and most developing countries place
substantial controls on the admittance and treatment of foreign
direct investment.1 Such controls may be part of a domestic regulatory system that also applies to domestic investment (e.g., antitrust laws, banking regulations), or they may apply in a discriminatory manner to foreign investment. Discriminatory controls on
inward foreign direct investment imply a basic skepticism about
the national benefits of such investment - for political or economic reasons.
United States policy, at both the federal and local levels, reflects a strong positive attitude concerning the general benefits of
inward foreign direct investment. While foreign ownership of
United States assets is restricted in certain sectors, the general
United States approach is one of "national treatment" - i.e., foreign investors are treated as favorably as domestic investors with
respect to the application of United States laws and regulations.
The United States policy is an "open" one compared to that of
many other countries including most other countries of the Western Hemisphere. This fact reflects several special conditions in
the United States: (1) the fundamental market orientation of the
United States economy and the absence of pervasive national
governmental controls over the economy; (2) the historical experience of the United States in developing its economy through the
early part of this century on the basis of foreign capital and immigration; and (3) the vast size of the United States economy in
which foreign ownership of United States assets, albeit growing, is
relatively small.
The United States policy of openness and national treatment
toward foreign investment is beneficial to the United States economy and should be preserved and strengthened. At a time when
the United States is going through a major adjustment to changes
in the conditions of global competition - with the growing competitive challenges of Japan and a number of newly industrializing countries - the basic objectives of the United States are the
1. For a description of specific developed countries' policies, see A.
GOVERNMENTS

AND

MULTINATIONALS:

SAFARIAN,

POLICIES IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(1983). For a discussion of Western Hemisphere policies, see H. Bale, Foreign

Investment Policy, presented at Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge (April 1984) (copy on file at VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.).
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accelerated formation of capital and the adoption of new technology to assure the maintenance of and increase in United States
living standards and employment opportunities. This requires
savings and innovation.
The United States has not been generating sufficient domestic
savings during the past decade to meet the demands of domestic
individuals, corporations and governments, nor does it any longer
possess a near-monopoly over advanced technology and its application. It would be preferable for the United States to obtain foreign equity capital rather than borrow heavily abroad. However,
while there has been a substantial increase in recent years in foreign direct (equity) investment in the United States, it has only
been a fraction of the increase in United States indebtedness to
foreigners. 2 This trend of increased foreign indebtedness is largely
related to the combination of large deficits in recent federal budgets and the rapid expansion of private domestic investment since
1982.
Foreign indebtedness provides financing with the burden of future scheduled interest payments. In contrast, foreign direct investment can be an important supplement to domestic savings,
investment and technology; furthermore, payments to foreign
owners reflect returns on their risk capital which are made only if
the investment succeeds in generating a profit.
The following sections examine the major elements of United
States policy toward foreign investment - both the general policy and the major exceptions to it. There is also a discussion of
the recent experience of Canada in more extensively regulating
foreign investment. The paper concludes with a few observations
about the needs and prospects for a continued open United
States investment policy.
II.

THE GROWING INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

ECONOMY

Since the middle of the last decade, there has been a marked
acceleration in the process of internationalization of the United
States economy. One index of this change is the measure of the
size of our international commerce in relation to our total economic activity. In 1960, United States merchandise exports
amounted to 4.1 percent of the United States gross national prod2. See

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT at

349 (1985).
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uct (GNP). By 1970, this ratio had risen only to 4.4 percent; but
in 1980 it had reached 8.5 percent. The increase in the ratio of
United States imports to GNP has been even more dramatic. Between 1960 and 1970 it had increased from 2.9 percent to 4.1 percent. In 1980, this ratio had climbed to 9.5 percent.'
The growing United States economic interdependence with the
rest of the world has been accompanied by a growing national debate over United States trade performance and policy - particularly in light of a trade deficit that exceeded $120 billion in 1984,
and is expected to reach $140 billion in 1985.
The international exchange of goods is, however, only one aspect of the growing internationalization of the United States
economy. International capital flows have also become an increasingly important element of United States economic activity.
United States firms have invested heavily in overseas operations
since World War II. Between 1950 and 1984, the estimated value
of funds directly invested by United States companies and individuals in enterprises abroad increased from $12 billion to $233
billion.4
The substantial foreign operating presence of United States
firms is a well-recognized phenomenon in the United States. The
latest available survey (1977) of United States-affiliated companies operating overseas showed that 3,540 United States companies had almost 25,000 affiliates abroad with over $829 billion in
assets, or over one-quarter of the assets of their United States
parent companies.5 Foreign direct investment in the United
States is currently valued at less than United States direct investment abroad; however, it is growing rapidly and is becoming an
important economic phenomenon in the United States economy.
By the end of 1984, the cumulative level of such investment will
exceed $150 billion. While this is only two-thirds of the level of

3. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM: 1983 183 (1984) [hereinaf-

ter cited as
4.

ANNUAL REPORT].

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 31 SURVEY OF

CURRENT BuSINEss at 7 (Dec. 1951) & 64 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS at 30

(Aug. 1985). Direct investment, according to the official United States definition,
requires a beneficial ownership interest of at least 10 percent of assets by a single United States national or company in a foreign enterprise. 63 SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS at 14 (Aug. 1983).
5. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF
VESTMENT ABROAD, 1977 at 20 (Apr. 1981).

COMMERCE, U.S. DIRECT IN-
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United States direct investment abroad, it had amounted to less
than one-fifth of the latter in 1970, and less than one-third as late
as 1979.6 After 1979, the United States became the largest cumulative recipient of foreign direct investment.7 Substantial capital
inflows have been occurring over the past half-decade, and it is
likely that large direct capital inflows will continue. Since 1977,
inward foreign direct investment has increased relative to the
growth of the United States economy. According to a recent Commerce Department study, the percentage of total United States
assets owned by domestic affiliates of foreign companies increased
substantially in three major categories - mining, manufacturing
and wholesale trade. In mining, the foreign ownership ratio increased from 9 percent in 1977 to 15 percent in 1981. Foreign
ownership of United States assets in manufacturing doubled,
from 6 to 12 percent; and in wholesale trade, the foreign ownership ratio increased from 17 to 28 percent. 8
United States employment in affiliates of foreign companies in
1977 was 1.13 million, or 1.4 percent of total United States nonagricultural employment. In 1981, affiliates' United States employment rose to 2.34 million or 2.7 percent of nonagricultural employment. Approximately 24 percent of the employees of affiliates
of foreign companies were located in the Southeast region of the
United States. An estimated 580 thousand employees in the
Northeast constituted approximately 3.4 percent of the nonagricultural employment in the region. In 1977, the comparable ratio
was 1.4 percent. Between 1977 and 1982 the Southeast became
the region with the greatest concentration of employees of foreign
affiliates, surpassing the Middle Atlantic region by 23 thousand
employees in 1982. The leading Southeast states in employment
by affiliates were North Carolina (92,170), Georgia (78,938), Florida (75,981), South Carolina (60,914) and Tennessee (58,709).1
Most foreign direct investment in the Southeastern part of the
6.
7.

64 SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINEss, supra note 4, at 27 (Oct. 1984).
INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT IN-

U.S. ROLE 19 (Aug. 1984).
8. Id. at 21.
9. See N. Howenstine, U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies: Operations in
1982, in 64 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 38, 40 (Dec. 1984);
INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 22, 72; BUREAU OF THE CEN-

VESTMENT: GLOBAL TRENDS AND THE

SUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1984 408 (104th ed. 1984);

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1979 409 (100th ed. 1979).
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United States is in petroleum, real estate, chemicals and a variety
of manufacturing activities. 10 Approximately one-third of all of
the gross book value of property, plant and equipment of manufacturing affiliates of foreign companies operating in the United
States is located in the Southeast." This suggests that the Southeast is particularly suited to attract foreign manufacturing operations, compared with other regions of the United States.
The most important country of origin of foreign direct investment in the United States is, as of the end of 1983, the United
Kingdom ($32.5 billion). Other countries at the top of the list of
foreign investment sources are the Netherlands ($28.8 billion), Japan ($11.1 billion), West Germany ($10.5 billion), and Switzerland ($7.1 billion). The countries of OPEC, as a group, have
placed $4 billion in direct investment in the United States (or 3
percent of the total).12 As of 1983, more than half of the OPEC
countries' direct investment in the United States consisted of a
single investment of $2.5 billion by Kuwait in the 1981 purchase
of Santa Fe International Corporation, an oil exploration and engineering firm.' 3

III. REASONS FOR THE INWARD FLOW OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT

A recent survey of Dutch firms with operations in the United
States reported on reasons that Dutch investors gave for establishing their United States operations. The primary reasons given
were: (1) to better service United States customers; (2) to expand
markets in the United States; and (3) to diversify the parent
firms' financial and operating resources. A much smaller group
cited access to United States technology as an important motivation.' 4 The reasons given in this survey of Dutch investors are
quite understandable and are probably typical of the motives of
most foreign investors. Yet, there are more fundamental reasons
as to why the United States market has been singled out in recent
years as a market for foreign investors to establish operations.

INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 22.
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DiRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980 76, 80 (Oct. 1983).
12. 64 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, supra note 4, at 38 (Dec. 1984).
13. INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 79.
14. ARTHUR YOUNG INTERNATIONAL, RESULTS OF A SURVEY OF DUTCH INVESTORS THAT HAVE ESTABLISHED OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1983).
10.

11.
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Table 1 shows the distribution of inward direct investment of major industrialized countries since 1960. In the decade of the 1960s
the United States received less than 3 percent of the total inward
direct investment of these countries; however, in the last several
years, the United States has received most of such investment.
Meanwhile, flows of foreign direct investment to Canada, Australia, Italy, and Germany have declined in relative importance.
Why? After all, have not the European and Japanese economies
grown, even relative to the growth of the United States for much
of the past decade?
TABLE 1
Inward Direct Investment Flows
Percentage Distribution Among 13 Countries
(Percentages)
1961-67
1968-73 1974-78
1979-82
Canada
United States
Japan
Australia
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Spain
Norway

16.2
2.6
2.0
15.6
4.5(2)
8.2
21.3
11.5
4.7
2.4
9.7
2.7
0.8

12.1
11.4
1.7
12.9
6.1
8.2
16.4
8.3
8.5
1.7
7.4
3.7
1.4

3.2
26.7
1.2
9.5(1)
9.4
15.2
14.7
5.0
6.0(3)
0.5(4)
6.1
3.7
4.1

Negative
50.9
1.0
6.6
6.2
8.6
3.0
2.4
4.5
0.6
11.8
5.6
1.4

1) From 1974 to 1976; 2) From 1965; 3) From 1974 to 1978; 4) From 1974 to 1977
SOURCE: Recent International Direct Investment Trends, OECD Paris, 1981; Balance of
Payments Yearbook, International Monetary Fund.

Among the basic reasons for the rapid growth of foreign investment in the United States in recent years are the following: (1)
the postwar maturation of the economies of Europe and Japan
has featured the growth of "world-class" companies which can
compete with United States companies in both international and
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the United States markets; in 1960, forty-two of the world's largest companies had their headquarters in the United States; in
1980, however, the number had dropped to twenty-one; 15 as these
companies entered world markets, they behaved like their United
States counterparts and invested overseas, in the United States
and elsewhere; (2) the United States has the world's largest market virtually free of any internal barriers to the movement of
goods and services; the development of Europe's "Common Market" is, in this regard, still far off, as many trade barriers between
its members still exist; (3) the United States has a relatively stable economic and political environment, with a trend toward a
lower degree of taxation, regulation and inflation in recent years;
(4) there are generally good labor relations in the United States;
for example, more than 90 percent of the Dutch investors surveyed as mentioned above, experienced no significant labor disruptions or strikes over a recent two year period; and (5) there are
few restrictions on the establishment of foreign enterprises in the
United States; that is, unlike many countries where foreign investment proposals are screened by governmental bodies, the
United States has no systematic process of screening (and rejecting) foreign investments.
The remainder of this paper will address the last point in more
detail. Policies toward foreign investment at the federal and state
levels can potentially do much to affect the volume of investment
flows. The foreign investment regulations in Canada briefly discussed below illustrate this point.
IV.

THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

In September of 1983, the Administration issued a statement of

its policy toward foreign direct investment. The basic policy hypothesis is summed up in the statement that "an open international investment system responding to market forces provides
the best and most efficient mechanism to promote global economic development." And with respect to foreign direct investment in the United States, the statement outlines the following:
The United States has consistently welcomed foreign direct investment in this country. Such investment provides substantial benefits to the United States. Therefore, the United States fosters a
15.

INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 7, at 7.
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domestic economic climate which is conducive to investment. We
provide foreign investors fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory
treatment under our laws and regulations. We maintain exceptions
to such treatment only as are necessary to protect our security and
related interests and which are consistent with our international
legal obligations.16
Three key phrases in the paragraph essentially describe the general policy approach of the federal government toward foreign
investment.
A.

Nondiscriminatory Treatment

Under United States laws and regulations, the principle of "national treatment" prevails toward inward foreign investment.
That is, foreign nationals and companies are treated as favorably
as nationals or companies of the United States with respect to the
establishment and operation of enterprises in this country. Thus,
with regard to antitrust, security, environmental, trade or other
regulations, there is no differentiation between United States or
foreign ownership in their application to business activities.1"
The nondiscriminatory principle adhered to under United
States laws and regulations also applies to treatment of investors
of different foreign nationalities. The basic United States policy is
generally not to give preferential treatment to investments from
one country of origin relative to those from another country. This
is the so-called most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. 18 Thus,
Canadians can make and operate investments on the same basis
as investors from the United Kingdom. Further, on the basis of
the national treatment principle, investors from other countries
can generally make investments in this country on the same legal
terms as American investors. 9
Few countries pursue a national treatment policy as broadly as

16. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 174.
17. See Vagts, United States of America's Treatment of Foreign Investment, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 374, 377 (1963).
18. Fry, ForeignInvestment in the United States and Canada:The Setting,
in

REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA

AND THE UNITED

1, 5 (E. Fry & L. Radebaugh eds. 1983).
19. Bale, The U.S. Federal Government's Policy Towards ForeignDirect In-

STATES

vestment, in

REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA AND THE

29, 41 (E. Fry & L. Radebaugh eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
U.S. Federal Government's Policy].

UNITED STATES
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does the United States.2 0 Most industrial and developing countries maintain a wide range of discriminatory measures against
foreign investors. For example, the establishment of enterprises
may be limited or restricted to joint ventures with local enterprises; or foreign-owned enterprises may also not have access to
local credit markets, government procurement contracts, or government financial assistance. United States investors find a considerable degree of obstacles even to investing in many Western
Hemisphere countries, particularly Canada and Mexico.21
If foreign countries do not permit United States investors to
establish and operate enterprises in their territory, why shouldn't
the United States government pursue a policy of reciprocity, instead of national and MFN treatment? Should we not treat the
investors from companies of foreign countries in the same way as
the treatment provided by the home government of the investor?
The United States government's response to the suggestion of
reciprocity as a general policy rule applicable to foreign investment issues has traditionally been negative. The reason is that
most businessmen, labor leaders and consumers, as well as federal, state and local government officials believe that foreign investment is a positive addition to the economic resources and
technology of this country, regardless of the treatment accorded
foreign investment in other countries. To copy the practices of
other countries and restrict the establishment and acquisition of
companies in this country would be to deny employment and income opportunities to United States workers and shareholders.2 2
B.

International Legal Obligations

In accordance with these policy attitudes, the Federal Government has entered into a number of international treaties that require it to provide national and MFN treatment to foreign investors. In return, foreign treaty partners agree also to provide
nondiscriminatory treatment to United States investors. The
United States has treaties of this type with a number of countries
20. See Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), National Treatment: A Major InternationalInvestment Issue of the 1980s (1982).

21. See generally U.S. Federal Government's Policy, supra note 19.
22. For further discussion of the national treatment policy of the United

States and the reasons therefor, see U.S. Federal Government's Policy, supra
note 19, at 29-46.
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including Japan, Korea, Germany, Israel, Taiwan and the Netherlands.23 These treaties are voted upon by the Senate and are
binding at both the federal, state and local levels. Such treaties
are beneficial instruments in securing political commitments to
maintain liberal policies governing foreign investment flows.
Thus, Japanese investors are guaranteed nondiscriminatory treatment for their investments in the United States by agreements
that are legally enforceable in United States courts. United States
government officials have traditionally held that treaties of the
type described above help to encourage the flow of international
investment. In 1981, the United States Government launched a
major effort to negotiate such treaties with developing countries,
in order to help stimulate the flow of private equity capital to
countries that have depended too much on external debt
24
financing.
C.

Exceptions to National and MFN Treatment

As noted above, the United States has a nondiscriminatory policy which is attractive to foreign investors. It generally treats the
establishment and operation of foreign-owned enterprises under
its laws as it treats domestically owned ones. It was also mentioned that the United States generally does not favor one nationality of investor over a different nationality with respect to the
application of its laws. Further, this policy is backed up by international treaty obligations. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to
these principles. The exceptions are based upon consideration of:
(a) national security; (b) state-level restrictions; and (c)
reciprocity.
1.

National Security Related Exceptions

The United States Government restricts foreign ownership in
areas where the national security may be affected. These restrictions exist in areas such as aviation, ocean and coastal transportation, public communications and energy production. For example,
United States citizens must own at least seventy-five percent of

23. C. Sullivan, Study on the Standard Draft Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Washington, Department of State (copy available on file
with author).
24. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 1980-81 78-79 (1982).
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the voting interests of United States airlines. United States registered vessels must be owned by United States citizens or by companies whose boards of directors are largely United States citizens. Foreigners may not generally receive licenses for United
States nuclear power facilities. Radio and television broadcast licenses may not be held by aliens.25
Furthermore, under United States defense programs, security
clearances are required for personnel of companies who have necessary access to classified information or who work on classified
projects. Such clearances are difficult to obtain by companies
whose owners are foreign, although voting trusts may be established under which the foreign owners benefit, but do not manage, the controlled firm doing classified work.26
Department of Defense officials have, at times, also been concerned that foreign acquisitions could threaten the continuity of
companies in the United States which produce goods of actual or
potential military use. For example, in 1984, Pentagon officials
expressed fears about the continued existence of a ball-bearing
company under plans for acquisition by a Japanese-owned firm. A
Pentagon spokesman stated that the concern was that a "viable
industrial base" be maintained for ball-bearing products.27 The
acquisition was also reviewed under antitrust statutes by the Justice Department, which in February 1985, approved the
takeover.28
2.

State Restrictions

State governments regulate the entry of firms into the banking
and insurance industries under their jurisdiction. In doing so, a
number of them have placed limitations on the degree of participation by foreign investors in both of those sectors, although
some restrictions also apply to out-of-state investors as well. In
both the banking and insurance sectors states often stipulate a
minimum proportion of residents and United States citizens on
boards of directors, and require more paid-in capital or less
reserves. Also, many states apply a reciprocity criterion to inves25.

See U.S. Federal Government's Policy, supra note 19, at 45-46; see also

U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, (Sept. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES].
26. See FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 25, at 11, 12.

27. Wall Street J., Oct. 5, 1984, at 14, col. 1.
28. Wall Street J., Feb. 27, 1985, at 22, col. 1.
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tors from out-of-state and abroad; that is, the investor's home
state or country must allow participation by the bank or insurance companies of the state into which the investor wishes to
enter. In any case, the conditions placed on foreign investors
tend, on the whole, to be greater than those placed on out-ofstate investors.9 And some states, though not a very large number, also restrict foreign holdings of real estate, state-owned
lands, or state-owned mineral deposits.3 0
One barrier to foreign investors that is frequently cited is the
use by some states of the worldwide unitary system of tax apportionment, or "unitary tax." A small number of states, including
California, Oregon and Florida, have based their taxation of corporate incomes in recent years on the worldwide income of related units of an enterprise. For foreign investors, such a taxation
scheme subjects their various business operations (which typically
constitute the predominant properties of their worldwide business) to review and factoring by state tax officials. This tax system has raised substantial protests by foreign investors and the
governments of the United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands and
Canada. Nevertheless, the tax system per se is not discriminatory:
United States firms with substantial overseas operations have also
claimed to be adversely affected. Yet, foreign investors do tend to
be more greatly affected given their higher ratio of foreign to
United States business activities. Following considerable opposition raised to the worldwide unitary tax approach by organized
groups of foreign investors, most states using this method have or
are considering its repeal, including the three states mentioned
above. 31

29.

See generally Cohen & Murphy, Foreign Investment in United States

Banking, inMANUAL

OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

326-95 (J.

Marans, P. Williams, J. Griffin & J. Pattison, eds., 2d ed. 1984).
For a summary of state laws governing foreign ownership of and interests
MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 29, at 508-36.
30.

in real estate, see
31.

DEP'T OF

THE TREASURY, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE WORLDWIDE UNITARY

1-3
(Aug. 1984); H. Bale, International Trends and Investment Implications of
Worldwide Unitary Taxation, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 20, 1984)
(copy on file at VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.).

TAXATION WORKING GROUP: CHAIRMAN'S REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS
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Federal Reciprocity

Despite a general policy which rejects investment reciprocity,
federal laws and policies are not entirely free of elements of reciprocity in the determination of whether a foreign investor can engage in certain lines of business in the United States. Under the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,32 foreign investors may acquire leases or interest in coal, oil and gas deposits on federal
lands only if they do so through a domestic corporation and if the
investors' home country grants "similar or like" rights to United
States investors.3 3 For example, in 1983 the Secretary of the Interior, responsible for administering the 1920 Act, found that Kuwait's customary treatment of United States investors is discriminatory against the latter compared to treatment accorded other
foreign investors. As a result, Kuwait was found to be nonreciprocal under the Act. This decision prevented access to federal mineral lands for Santa Fe International, a United States corporation
wholly owned by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC). KPC
is a government-owned Kuwait corporation. However, in 1984, a
United States District Court remanded the matter to the Interior
Department. The Court found that the Secretary did not have a
proper basis for finding Kuwait nonreciprocal 3 4 In February 1985
the Interior Department reversed its earlier finding and deter35
mined that Kuwait met the reciprocal requirements of the Act.
Additional elements of reciprocal treatment of foreign investors
have been introduced into federal legislation through the International Trade and Investment Act of 1984.36 Section 304 states
that the President may take actions to restrict or deny the authorization of foreign investments in the service sector, if the

32. Pub. L. No. 86-705, 74 Stat. 781 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
33. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 25, at 3.
34. Santa Fe Int'l Corp. v. Watt, 591 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1984).
35. Interior's finding was based upon the fact that Japanese interests were
not nationalized along with U.S. ownership interests in Kuwait in 1974. However, the Court accepted Santa Fe International's contention that Kuwait's nationalizations were not directed at U.S. nationals, but were based upon objective
economic considerations, independent of nationality or ownership of oil interests. 591 F. Supp. at 942. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Decision on the
Status of Kuwait Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, March 10, 1983 and
February 7, 1985.
36. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3000 (codified in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.).
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home country of the foreign investor places undue restrictions on
United States service sector investments.3 7 Thus, if a foreign
country restricts United States banking activities, then the President may take action similarly to limit banking investments by
residents of that country.
V.

FEDERAL "REvIEw" OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

In response to increasing Congressional concerns about the
growing inward financial flows from OPEC and other countries
after the first "oil shock" in 1973, President Ford issued Executive Order 11858 in May of 1975, establishing the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)3 8 The Committee is charged with monitoring the impact of foreign direct
and portfolio investment in the United States. It has, inter alia,
the duty to "review investments in the United States which, in
the judgment of the Committee, might have major implications
for United States national interests." 9 It is also charged to consult with foreign governments on prospective major governmental
investments in the United States and propose legislation as appropriate. 40 The Committee has interpreted its mandate so that,
in practice, almost all cases which undergo a formal CFIUS review involve a foreign government or foreign-government entity
as the investor. Concern, both within and without the Administration, has been expressed about the possible adverse impact of
foreign government controlled investments on the United States
economy. For example, large state-owned French and Kuwaiti oil
companies have made substantial acquisitions of energy companies in the United States in recent years.
There is increasing participation of governments abroad in foreign enterprises that are, or are becoming, multinational in their
operations. One broad category of concerns is related to United
States security. There is concern that such investments in United
States strategic resources may lead to underdeveloping or otherwise manipulating these resources to the disadvantage of the
United States in periods of resource-supply shortage. Another related concern is the acquisition of sensitive military United States
technologies by foreign governments through their investments in
37. Id. § 304.
38. Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 20263-64.
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the United States. A further concern is that foreign governmental
investors will place their own national concerns above the best
interests of the United States affiliate and consequently, contribute to inefficiencies in the United States economy. With their taxpayers backing an investment, for example, foreign governments
might subsidize their United States subsidiary and destroy all
United States fair market competition by taking a below market
return on its investment. Foreign governments might impose
"buy-national" policies on its foreign subsidiaries even if locally
produced products were more competitive. It should be noted,
however, that the CFIUS has not yet found a foreign investment,
even by governmentally controlled or owned enterprises, to be
contrary to the national interest.
In any case, under its current mandate the CFIUS has no authority itself to block any foreign investment in the United
States. Were CFIUS to find a certain investment to be a threat to
United States national interests, it would have to identify other
existing laws for a remedy - or propose legislation. 41 For example, the United States could block an investment through a Presidential invocation of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act.4 2 The action would require him to declare a national
emergency; however, this power certainly does not lend itself to
frequent or regular use.
Another "shortcoming" of CFIUS as a screening mechanism is
that the Committee cannot compel a foreign investor to delay an
investment while the CFIUS is reviewing the case. It can only request a delay. 43 There has been some sentiment in the United
States Congress and private sector recently for more effectively
controlling foreign governmental investments in the United
States. However, there have been only few concrete legislative
proposals introduced in the Congress so far, and they have not
been given much attention.
Because there are concerns in the United States about foreign
government controlled investments and the absence of effective
tools to deal with the issue, the Administration itself has reviewed
in the recent past possible legislative approaches for enhancing
the powers of the Committee. The current position of the Administration is, however, that the enhancement of governmental pow-

41.
42.
43.

40 Fed. Reg. at 20263-64.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
See 40 Fed. Reg. at 20264.
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ers in the area of foreign investment control should not be pursued. Any regulatory approach which would still maintain a
basically open United States policy toward United States foreign
investment has not been found.
VI.

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO DIRECT INVESTMENT

Financial aids to direct investment given by governments at
both the national and local levels are an important aspect of federal and state policies toward foreign direct investment in the
United States. Nearly all governments of market oriented economies provide incentives to promote investments, and make many
of those incentives (and, often, additional ones) available to foreign investors. Certainly, the United States federal government
currently seeks to expand domestic private investment, whether
or not sourced from abroad as a stimulus to greater growth, employment and productivity through tax and financial incentives
(e.g., accelerated depreciation). All of our state governments have
programs to attract investment, particularly to less prosperous regions. Tax relief, land grants, infrastructure and labor subsidies,
and preferred borrowing terms have been made available by
states and localities to both domestic and foreign investors.
The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has been examining the role and impact of
incentives on international investment decisions for several years.
The work there suggests that the major impact of incentives offered to foreign investors is on the location of investments within
a region of neighboring countries or subnational political units
comprising, more or less, a common market zone. 4 That is, firms
tend to make decisions about where to locate their investments
within a broad area independently of competing investment incentives; however, within the region, incentives can be an important factor in a location decision. On the other hand, basic business decisions (e.g., whether to invest abroad or export) are not
significantly affected by incentives. Business, it is often argued,
evaluates investment projects net of any incentives offered, in
terms of business risks, costs, political stability and investment
climate. To quote one recent study:
Perhaps one reason why businesses base investment decisions on
44. OECD,

INVESTMENT INCENTIVES

TIONAL INVESTMENT PROCESS

AND DISINCENTIVES AND THE INTERNA-

66-70 (1983).
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factors other than incentives is linked to their desire for flexibility.
If a project requires incentive aid to make it attractive, then the
business must depend on continued governmental support to justify the position. By selecting options which are sensible, net of
incentives, businesses can better guarantee that their decisions will
be sensible whatever happens to aid programs.4 5
Nevertheless, incentives can positively affect the timing and location of investments if financial aids are significant, predictable
and free of accompanying performance requirements that are
costly from a business perspective (such as local purchasing requirements or inflexible employment requirements).4 6
In the United States, the state and local governments use incentives to compete against each other. In addition, United States
localities may often be in competition with Canadian provinces
and Mexico for investment. An advantage that our states have
over locations in either Mexico or Canada is that the national
governments of the latter two countries utilize investment screening procedures and have very often, in recent years, imposed onerous performance requirements on foreign investors. 47 These requirements have offset, to a considerable degree, the abundant
financial incentives, labor cost advantages and low exchange rates
of these neighboring, and competing, countries. To the author's
knowledge, United States states have limited their "performance
requirements" almost exclusively to geographic target areas and
environmental standards.
VII.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT POLICIES: THE
CASE OF CANADA

Since 1974, Canadian federal government has screened most
foreign investments according to whether individual investments
were likely to be of "significant benefit" to Canada. Under the
Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA),4 8 Canada's screening ap-

45.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITEE, OECD COMMITTEE ON IN-

TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, RELATIONSHIP OF IN-

CENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DECISIONs 24 (1981).

46. Id. at 24, 28-30.
47. See H. Bale, Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 1; see also H. Bale,
Trade Policy Aspects of InternationalInvestment Policies, in NBER CONFERENCE REPORT: RECENT ISSUES AND INITIATIVES IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 72-82 (R.
Baldwin ed. 1984).
48. Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973, Act of Dec. 12, 1973, ch. 46,
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plies to the opening of new establishments by foreigners, the entry into new bases of activity by foreign-owned Canadian enterprises and the acquisition of Canadian enterprises by foreigners
(whether or not the Canadian enterprises acquired were initially
foreign-owned or controlled).49
Until 1974, Canada's regulation of inward foreign direct investment was limited to a sectoral approach similar to that in the
United States, with controls applied at both the federal and provincial levels. Only foreign ownership and control in Canada's
banking, insurance, broadcasting, airlines, newspapers, and trust
companies were restricted under Canadian law.20 After 1974, however, the general screening procedure established by the FIRA
was overlaid onto the sectoral restrictions. According to the Canadian government, the purpose of the screening was not to curtail
foreign investment - although a political debate had occurred
since the late 1950's over the high degree of foreign ownership in
Canada. Rather, the purpose was to ensure that foreign investment brought significant benefits to Canada. Foreign investors
were requested to legally bind themselves to commitments regarding local employment, purchases of locally produced goods,
exports, research and development in Canada, Canadian management, etc.51 Nevertheless, while most investment proposals were
accepted by the Canadian authorities (each project requiring a
decision by the Canadian federal Cabinet), many proposals were
not made, and many others were discouraged from being made.
A further major development in Canada's investment policy
came in 1980. In that year, the administration of Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau introduced a new National Energy Program
(NEP) which sought, inter alia, to decrease the degree of foreign
ownership of Canada's oil and gas investments from almost seventy percent in 1980 to fifty percent by 1990. The goal of

1973-1974 Can. Stat. 619, amended by ch. 52, 1976-1977 Can. Stat. 1274.
49. J. Turner, CanadianRegulation of Foreign Direct Investment, 23 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 333, 338-42 (1983); S. GLOBERMAN, U.S. OWNERSHIP OF FIRMs IN CANADA: ISSUES AND POLICY APPROACHES (1979); Hufbauer & Samet, Investment Re-

lations Between Canada and the United States, in CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES: DEPENDENCE AND DIVERGENCE 103 (W. Armstrong & L. Armstrong, eds.
1982).
50. A. SAFARIAN, GOVERNMENTS AND MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 15.
51. See H. Bale, Investment Frictions and Opportunities in Bilateral U.S.Canadian Trade Relations 17-18, (Nov. 18, 1983) (available on file at VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L.).
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"Canadianization" under the NEP was intended by the Trudeau
government to be achieved by purchasing foreign-owned companies. 52 Measures designed to favor Canadian-owned energy companies were introduced, including subsidies for costs of exploration based directly upon the degree of Canadian ownership of an
exploration company, and a maximum fifty percent limitation on
foreign ownership in companies operating the Canadian federal
lands. 3
The NEP represented a very significant change in Canada's investment policy affecting a major economic sector. Certainly, Canadian concerns about the ownership of a majority of new investments in its oil and gas industry can be understood. However,
Canadian policy affected existing investments in Canada. The exploration costs subsidies discriminated against foreign-owned
companies. In effect, Canada reversed its policy toward foreign
investment in the energy field, which had been welcomed before
1980. In doing so, the Canadian government's policy created an
atmosphere of uncertainty among foreign investors even outside
of the energy industry. The NEP was perceived as a program
forcing divestiture by foreign investors, and concerns were expressed that the NEP approach might be copied in other sectors.
The combination of the application of the FIRA and the NEP
also led to a political reaction in the United States companies and
the Reagan Administration that threatened to materially worsen
bilateral economic relations.54
The effect of Canada's FIRA and NEP can be seen in the flows
of direct investment across Canada's borders. Table 2 shows that
the flow of direct investment into Canada peaked in the early
1970's. After 1975, inward flows actually declined, and then became negative after the NEP was announced. Meanwhile, Canadian investment going abroad had continued to climb, with a very
substantial amount in 1981, so that Canada became a net exporter of direct investment capital after 1975.

52. A.

SAPARIAN, GOVERNMENTS AND MULTINATIONALS,

MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES CANADA,

PROGRAM 49

53.

supra note 1, at 16;

THE NATIONAL ENERGY

(1980).

MINISTRY OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES CANADA, THE NATIONAL EN-

ERGY PROGRAM 39-41 (1980).
54. See HOUSE COMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97th CONG. 2D SESS.,
IMPACT OF CANADIAN ENERGY AND INVESTMENT POLICIES ON U.S. COMMERCE

(Comm. Print 1982).
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TABLE 2

Flows of Foreign Direct Investment To and From Canada
(1965-1983)
(C$ Millions)

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

(1)

(2)

(3)

Flows of Foreign
Direct Investment
into Canada

Canadian Direct
Investment Abroad

Net
[(1)-(2)]

C$

535
790
691
590
720
905
925
620
830
845
725
-300
475
135
750
800
-4,400
-900
200

C$

125
5
125
225
370
313
230
400
770
810
915
590
740
2,325
2,550
3,150
6,900
950
2,700

C$

410

785
566
365
350
592
695
220
60
35
-190
-890
-265
-2,190
-1,800
-2,350
-11,300
-1,850
-2,500

SOURCE:

Statistics Canada - Quarterly Estimates of the Canadian Balance of International Payments, Second Quarter 1984

NOTE:

Excludes reinvested earnings

The lessons of the Canadian experience are that a policy of excessive intervention in the decision-making of foreign investors
(as carried out under the FIRA), and sharp negative shifts in policy affecting existing investors (such as occurred under the NEP)
will have an adverse effect on the ability to attract foreign direct
investment. It is interesting to note that Canada has, for some
years, offered substantial financial incentives to investors, both
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foreign and domestic, at the federal and provincial levels. 5 5 Can-

ada's experience since 1974 exemplifies the weakness of incentives
as an attraction to foreign investors in the context of a national
policy according to which foreign ownership is considered, per se,
undesirable.
The new Canadian federal administration of Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney has recognized the adverse effects that excessive
government regulation have had on the flows of foreign investment into Canada. In December 1984, a bill to amend the FIRA
was introduced into the Canadian parliament. The new "Investment Canada" agency would be limited to reviewing acquisitions
by foreigners which exceed C$5 million. It would not review proposals to establish new businesses (except in "sensitive" sectors).
The purpose of the new bill is to "encourage as much as possible"
the stimulation of trade and industrial development.5 6 By retaining the right to screen large acquisitions, the Canadian government will not make the most of the opportunity to attract foreign
investment; however, the government will be making an important substantive improvement by exempting new businesses established by foreigners. Also, foreign investors will tend to be assured of favorable consideration and fairer treatment under a
government whose basic attitude is more positive toward foreign
investment, as noted by Minister Sinclair Stevens who is directly
responsible for administering Canada's foreign investment law:
"Perceptions play a vital role in the world of investment. The
words and actions of a government can tip the delicate57 balance
underlying a country's reputation as a place to invest.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

Few countries can afford to discriminate against foreign investment for a prolonged period of time. Perhaps Japan, which has
been able to generate sufficient savings to finance internal credit
needs, is one of those few. It is unlikely that the United States
will ever return to a condition in which inward direct investment
55. Grenier, Theoretical and Real Investment Restrictions and Incentives
in the Province of Quebec, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN DiRECT INVESTMENT IN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 65-66 (E. Fry and L.H. Radebaugh, eds. 1983).
56. Investment Canada, Press Release and Background Statement by the
Honorable Sinclair Stevens Following the Tabling of the Investment Canada

Bill, Ottawa, December 7, 1984.
57. Id.

19851

UNITED STATES POLICY

does not make a significant contribution to the national economy
by supplementing domestic savings and investment.
There is, of course, more that could be done to encourage
greater rates of business, individual and particularly government
saving. Our nation's fiscal policies should be examined from a
perspective of whether they meet the current and future need to
stimulate greater domestic saving and investment. We should
consider shifting our basis of taxation from income to expenditures, perhaps through some type of value-added tax.
Foreign investment will continue to be a necessary supplement
to the capital and technology resources of the United States. In
order to continue to be an attractive location for direct investment for overseas, the federal and state governments must continue to pursue certain policies that provide an environment conducive to attracting such investment. These policies include the
following:
(1) monetary and fiscal policies which promote noninflationary
growth: reduction of the federal deficit, maintainance of relatively
low taxes, and keeping the growth of the United States money
supply under control will assure foreign investors that the value
of their investment will be measured both in dollar and foreign
currency terms;
(2) the avoidance of discriminatory regulatory and tax measures that adversely affect investments already in place, and that
may discourage future investment: while technically not discriminatory, the unitary tax applied by some states in recent years adversely affected foreign investments and created an unfavorable
climate for foreign investments in these states; and
(3) the maintenance of a clear understanding on the part of foreign investors as to the sectors which are open to foreign investors: the scope of United States national security related exceptions to national treatment could be a problem for foreign
investment in United States high technology firms in the future,
given the large volume of private sector classified activity in defense-related research and production.
There is a strong interest on the part of states and localities
today to strengthen the United States environment for investment-from both domestic and foreign sources. In the absence of
stable and nondiscriminatory political and economic conditions
for foreign investors, financial incentives will not be sufficient to
attract the foreign direct capital important for long-term United
States noninflationary growth.
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From a practical point of view, state and local officials could
become more aware of policy trends at the federal level which
could affect the flows of foreign investment to the United States.
In the past, some members of Congress have proposed a tightening of regulations of inward foreign investment. While no serious
proposal to restrict foreign investment is on the Congressional
agenda presently, the states should monitor possible future developments in order to avoid a federal intrusion into this field such as that which occurred in Canada under the FIRA and NEP
with substantial negative economic consequences for that
country.

